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1. Introduction
Until 1993 freezer trawlers have been the dominant vessels employed in the harvesting
of the hake stock in the Namibian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). At independence in
1990, Namibia saw its rich fishery resources as one of the vehicles available to it for the
badly needed economic development of its people. One of the important fishery policy
decisions taken by the government to enhance the economic development of Namibia is
the one that called for the restructuring of the trawler fleet in favour of wetfish trawlers
(see section 2.2 below). An interesting question to ask here is, is this new development
economically rational; if not, are there any reasons other than economic that may justify
this move? For example, is it the case that the gains in employment due to the
restructuring can compensate for the res ul ting economic loss, if any? Seeking answers
to these questions is the main purpose of this paper. The paper, thus, sets out to study
the exploitation of the hake stock off the Namibian coast, with a view to finding out the
proportion of the total annual quota that should be landed by the wetfish and the freezer
trawlers, respectively.
The principle underlying this work is economic efficiency, in other words, it is assumed
that the primary objective is to harvest and process the stock in the most economIcally
efficient manner. This assumption appears to be plausible in the case of Namibian
fisheries, which unlike the fisheries of most developing countries, are mainly industriaL. ¡
¡ Although small coastal communities caught fish in coastal lagoons during pre-colonial times, the only
indigenous fishing tradition amongst the peoples of the interiOl was freshwater fishing in the streams and
rivers of the north.
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Thus, most of the complications that usually arise due to the community-based nature of
certain fisheries are simply not present here. There is, therefore, an excellent opportunity
for pursuing and, indeed, achieving economIcally optimal management of the resources
of the Namibian EEZ. Moreover, the results to be computed herewith are meant to serve
as benchmarks for determining the trade-offs between different government policies: we
should, for instance, be able to discover what is being sacrifIced in economic terms due
to a government policy that is geared towards increasing employment in the industry, as
against one based purelyon economic efficiency criteria.
In more concrete terms, this paper seeks to:
· Test the government quota allocation policy target of 60:40 for the wetfish and
freezer trawlers, respectively, to see if it is optimal in an economIc sense.2 If not,
what is the optimal share of the quota that should be landed by these two class of
vessels?
. What discounted economic benefit would accrue to society at large under the optimal
allocation regime?
· What is the optimal number of both wetfish and freezer trawlers needed to achieve
these objectives?
. Finally, the paper would look at the employment generating capacities of the wetfish
and freezer trawlers. The trade-offs between the economic gains and the employment
generating capacities of the two class of vessels would also be discussed. There are at
2 By an optimal quota allocation I mean the allocation that would maximise the social planner's, that is,
the Namibian governments overall economic benefit from the resource.
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least two levels at which the employment generation capacity of the two types of
vessels can be analysed. First, the direct employment generation from the harvesting
and processing of the fish in readiness for the market. Second, the indirect
employment generation in the overall economy. Only an informal discussion of the
latter is given in this paper. On the other hand, a full analysis of the former is carried
out.
In the next section, I briefly discuss the hake fishery. Section 3 presents the
bioeconomic modeL. The numerIcal computations are carried out in section 4. This
section consists of two parts, the first sub-section discusses the data used in the analysis,
while the other sub-section presents the computations and the results therefrom. I then
proceed in section 5 to discuss the results of the study, while section 6 concludes.
2. The nature of the Namibian hake fishery
2.1 General
The hake stock is one of the three most important fish species of the highly productive
N amibian EEZ. The others are horse mackerel and pi1chard. The main reason for the
high productivity of the Namibian EEZ is the Benguela upwelling system prevalent in
the coastal zone of Namibia and other Southern African countries.
Among the species of hakes inhabiting the Namibian EEZ, that is, Merluccius capensis
(also known as cape hake), Merluccius paradoxus (deep-water hake) and Merluccius
polls, only the former two are of major importanee to the fishery. These two species are
so identical in appearance that they are of ten treated as one and the same, both in
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fisheries statistics and in analysis such as this one. However, their biology, ecology and
abundance differ considerably (Wysokinski, 1986). Both species are relatively long-
lived, reaching ages up to and over 10 years. Hakes are usually found close to the
bottom of the water during day-time but rise to intermediate water during night time,
probably following their prey.
Hake catches reached a maximum of over 800 000 tons in 1972, averaging some 600
000 tons annually during the period from the late 1960's to mid 1970's. As expected
these period of high catches was followed by lean years, with average catches of less
than 200 000 tons from the mid 1970's to 1980. This, however, rose again and remained
relatively stable between 300 - 400 000 tons for most of the 80's. It is stated in
Hamukuaya( 1994) that during those years of high catehes there was a large proportion
of young fish between the ages of 2 - 3 years old, probably accounting for the low
catches in later years.
At independence in 1990 the total allowable catch (T AC) for hake was set at a low of
about 50 000 tons mainly to help build up the stock. This has, however, been adjusted
upwards each year since then, reaching 150000 tons in 1994. These increases were due
to the apparent improvement in the hake biomass in the years immediately following
independence.
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2.2 Structure of the hake fishery
A large variety of fishing vessels are used to exploit hake. These vessels differ in their
gross registered tonnage (GRT), engine horse power (HP), processing equipment, and
freezing capacity. Hake are predominantly caught by wetfish and freezer bottom
trawlers. For instance, in 1994, out of a total of 108213 Mt. of hake landed, 99152 Mt.
were by wetfish and freezer trawlers. This is well over 90% of the totallandings of hake
that year. The rest is landed using monklsole trawlers, longliners, and mid-water
trawlers. The structure of the Namibian hake fisheries for 1994 is given in Table 2.1
below.
As a result of the overwhelming dominance of the bottom trawlers in the demersal hake
fishery, I focus my attention on these vessels and organise the wetfish and freezer
trawlers into two separate and distinet entities managed by two different bodies, from
now on, to be known as Wetfish Industry Group (w) and Freezer Industry Group (f),
respectively. This is c1early a simplification, since different types and sizes ofbottom
trawlers owned by different entities are actively fishing the waters off the Namibian
coast. The assumption would, however, make the analysis tractable without
compromising the essenee of the study: recall that the main essence of the study is to
find out what share of the hake T AC should be allocated to the wetfish and freezer
trawlers as separate groups. In other words, I am interested in determining the inter-
vessel rather than the intra-vessel allocation of the T AC.
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Before 1993 very litte of the hake quota was landed by wetfish trawlers. In 1992 for
instance, only about 5000 Mt. out of a total reported landings of 87498 Mt. were landed
by wetfish trawlers. Then came a new government policy that sought to restrueture the
fleet in favour of the wetfish trawlers, mainly to encourage onshore processing, and
thereby reap the benefits that are expected to follow it.
Table 2.1: The structure of the Namibian hake fisheries in 1994
Source: Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR), Namibia.
The announced policy is that 20%, 40% and 60% of the total quota for hake should be
allocated to the wetfish trawlers in 1993, 1994 and 1995, respectively. The ultimate aim
is to maintain an allocation of 60:40 in favour of the wetfish trawlers into the future.
Performance against stated objectives has been quite good up to 1994: in 1993, 19.9%
of the total quota was allocated to wetfish trawlers. The corresponding allocation for
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1994 was 48.9%, well over the target of 40%. However, the target of 60% for 1995
could not be achieved mainly because there was no increase in the TAC in 1995. The
1994 allocation of 48.9% to the wetfish trawlers was, therefore, maintained in that year.
2.4 Hake in the national economy
Generally , the fishing sector is an important component of the economy of Namibia,
with the hake fisheries being an important part of this. It has been estimated by the
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) of Namibia that hake contributed
about 7.4% of Namibia's estimated exports in 1994. Furthermore, the contribution to
GDP has been estimated at around N$ 230 milion, representing around 3% of GDP at
market prIces. It should be noted that this includes only the direct contribution to GDP,
additional contributions from secondary industries and the multiplier effects of spending
hake-related incornes are not included.
3. The model
A typical freezer trawler is usually larger than a typical wetfish trawler. It fishes in
deeper waters, probably catching larger and more valuable fish. In addition, it can stay
offshore for longer periods than the wetfish trawler. The freezer trawler is equipped
fully for catching, freezing and packaging at Sea. Therefore, all the processes needed,
from actual harve sting to packaging in readiness for export, are undertaken offshore.
There are two kinds of participants in the wetfÏsh business: factory owners who catch
and process hake in their factories, and private concessionaires, who catch hake and sell
7
their catch to the factory owners for further processing. In this paper, w, that is, the
Wetfish Industry Group, refers to the former group of participants. The latter group wil
be discussed in a later section of the paper. The factory owners undertake two distinct
activities, namely, offshore harvesting of hake and onshore processing.
This is a two-agent model for the hake fishery of the N amibian EEZ, the two agents
being w andl, signifying the Wetfish and Freezer Industry Groups, respectively.
Potentially, any situation where two or more agents with conflcting interests jointly
exploit a common property renewable resource is capable of bein g analysed using a
game theoretic framework. However, due to the assumptions underlying our model,
listed below, it turns out to be a straightforward optimisation one. In addition to the fact
that these assumptions seem reasonable, they can be further justified by using
methodologIcal and policy-needs arguments. MethodologIcally, it is always a wise
preposition to start an analysis of this nature with a simple structure and then proceed to
extend it as and when necessary. Policy-wise, it can be argued that the trade-offbetween
landing hake by wetfish and freezer trawlers is one of the burning policy issues facing
the MFMR at the moment.
3.1 The assumptions underlying the model
1. Annual quotas are assumed to be optimally and exogenously determined by the
MFMR. Hence, this study does not seek to give advice on what the optimal quota for
hake should be, but rather it seeks to advise on what percentage of the decided quota
should be harvested by the wetfish and freezer trawlers, respectively. The implication
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of this assumption is that it eliminates interaction at the level of the stock, thereby
eliminating dynamic externality.3
2. It is assumed here that there are no interactions between the two agents at the market
place. This assumption is reasonable because the agents sell their landings at
competitive markets where prices are exogeneously determined. The implication of
this assumption is to eliminate interaction by the agents at the marketplace (that is,
market externality).
3. It is further assumed that there are no signifIcant natural interactions between the
hake species and others. This implies that externality due to say, predator-prey
relations are ignored.4 Given the lack of adequate studies on interspeeies interactions
between the species living in the Namibian EEZ, this assumption is considered to be
a pragmatie one, whIch wil be relaxed as more biologIcal information becomes
available.
4. The model is deterministie in the sense that all parameters of the model are assumed
to be known with certainty. Also, future quotas are assumed to be known. Clearly,
these are strong assumptions. In the case of future quotas, for instance, we know that
yearly allocations are based on both scientifIc knowledge on the biomass of hake,
and policy related considerations, both of which are sure to var from year to year. A
future tas k would be to introduce uncertainty into the model. 5
3 Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Sumaila (1995), are studies where dynamic externality is present. A
possible extension of this paper would be to relax this assumption. Indeed, this would be the next task in
the series of studies planned for the hake stock.
4 See Fisher and Mirman (1992) and Sumaila (1997, forthcoming) for analyses that incorporate the
natural interaction between different species.
5 In the meantime, the model is designed to be flexible enough to allow quick sensitivity analysis, making
it possible to vary important parameters as new information flows in.
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The overall implication of assumptions (1) - (3) above is that even though there are two
agents exploiting a common property resource, we end up with a "trivial game theoretic
model". To have a truly game theoretical situation, the agents have to interact either in
the market place, at the level of the stock, or else there has to be natural interactions
between hake and the other species in the habitat. Thus, what we have in this model is a
straight forward constrained optimisation problem for each agent. Note that both players
are jointly constrained by the total quota available to them in each year.
3.2 Modeling the price of hake
The assumption of no interaction at the market place necessarily implies that both
wetfish and frozen fish are supplied at given prIces, implying that the price they receive
for their produee is inelastic to the quantities of fish they supply to the market. It should
be noted that the main market for Namibian hake is Spain. This is a large international
market supplied by many other sources of whIch Namibia is only one of many suppliers.
For Namibia or any of the other suppliers to be able to influence the market, there has to
be a withdrawal from the market of a large proportion (if not all) of her current output,
or else there has to be a sudden large increase in the quantity supplied by such a supplier
to the market - both of which are unlikely to happen under normal conditions.
3.3 Modeling the cost of landing hake
In general, two types of costs can be identified dep ending on whether one is talking of
the costs directly incurred by the agents in the model, that is, private costs or costs
incurred by society as a whole, that is, social costs.6 Usually these two are not identIcal
6 It is the government that is concerned about these costs, private agents would usually be concerned with
only their private costs.
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because of distortions in market prices and/or costs. As the focus of this study is on the
benefits to society as a whole, we wil be concerned mainly with social costs in this
paper. To get hold of these costs, I split the inputs that go into the harvesting and
proeessing of hake into the following co st elements.
3.3.1 eost elements associated with the freezer trawlers
Labour costs
The key variables that go into labour costs include, the size of the crew on a typIcal
freezer trawler; the number of officers and skippers on the vessel; and the cost of hiring
these class of labour for a given period of time to land a certain quantity of fish. These
are used to compute the expected cost of engaging skiled (Esc.! ), and unskiled (Euc.! )
crew members; skippers (ESk.!)' and officers (EoffJ)' to produce a unit weight of frozen
hake7. Here, the subscript sc, uc, sk, and off stand for skiled crew, unskiled crew,
skippers and officers, respectively, whilefrefers to the Freezer Industry Group.
Basic economIc theory postulates that the socially optimal E is the alternative cost of the
labour in question.8 Iassume here that the wages being currently paid out to skilled
crew members, officers, and skippers, represent the alternative cost of their labour. This
can be justified by the fact that there is no over supply of this c1ass of labour in
7 It should be mentioned here that normally payments to crew members, skippers and officers, are split
into two - a fixed and a variable part. The latter depends on actual landings.
8 Note that socially optimal is us 
ed here in an economic sense. For instance, by socially optimal co st, I
mean minimum cost incurred by society as a whole to achieve a stated objective, which in most cases is
different from private optimal cost.
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Namibia. On the other hand, due to the high level of unemployment among unskilled
crew members in the country, the current wages received by this class of workers are
well above the alternative value of their inputs. Thus, current earnings of unskiled
labour are adjusted by introducing a kind of "discounting" parameter for unskiled
labour costs.
Now, the total annual cost of engaging the required labour force for a given vessel, k/J'
can be expressed mathematically as
(1)
k/J = (aEuc,f + E1'CJ + E,'kJ + EoffJ)cp f
where cp f is the annual fishing capacity of a freezer vessel in unit weight; k denotes
costs, and the subscript L stands for labour as a whole; the parameter O -: a ~ 1 is the
percentage of unskilled crew labour earnings that can be said to be the alternative value
of this labour. Notice that a = 1 in the case of private costs.
Capital costs
The cost of acquiring a fully equipped freezer trawler wil form the basis for ca1culating
annual capital costs here. Suppose this cost is denoted by tì f ' then the annua! user cost
of capital, kc,f (where c stands for capital), can be expressed as9
9 This is true only under the assumption that capital gains or losses due to changes in the acquisition
value of capital are so low that they can be neglected.
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(2)
kc,¡ = (r + () f + p f)tJ f
Here, r is the real interest rate, () f the rate of depreciation of a typical freezer vessel, and
p f denotes a foreign exchange premium. The latter is necessary to account for the fact
that foreign exchange is not completely determined by the market in Namibia, and that
virtually all capital costs of acquiring a trawler are incurred in foreign currency.io All
these parameters are in percent of the capital acquisition value. Again, there is a
difference between private and social costs here: p f is zero in the case of private costs
because private agents care only about their direct private costs.
Operating expenses
These incIude annual costs of fuel and lubricating oil, repairs and maintenance, fishing
gear renewal, telecommunication and radio expenses, and management and
administrative costs. Others are general insurance cover for crew, catch, cargo, hull and
machinery; license fees, le vies and charges; harbour fees; and provisions. All these
would be counted by the agents as part of their costs, but social costs would not incIude
license fees, levies and charges.
¡O Labour costs are not subjected to this premium because the bulk of these are paid in local currency.
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The annual costs listed above, excIuding license fees, levies and charges, are added
together to obtain the annual social costs of landing and proeessing the average annual
harvest of a typIcal freezer trawler.
3.3.2 Cost elements associated with the wetfish trawlers
Labour costs
In addition to the offshore labour costs mentioned under freezer trawlers, some onshore
labour costs are incurred in proeessing in the case of wetfish trawlers. Thus annual
labour costs can be expressed as follows
(3)
ki,w = (a(Euc,w + Eou,w) + Esc,w + Esk,w + Eoff,w + Eos,w )CPw
where cp w is the annual fishing capacity of a wetfish vessel in unit weight;
E ou w and E Ol' W denote the cost of skiled and unskilled labour needed to process a ton of, "
hake onshore, and Euc,w' E,I'C,W' E,'k,w' and Eoff,w represent the various offshore costs.
Capital costs
There are two components to capital costs here, viz., the cost of acquiring a fully
equipped wetfish trawler and the cost of laying down the necessar infrastructure to
proeess the fish onshore. These two wil form the basis for calculating annual capital
costs. The formulation of costs in this case is exactly as in equation 2 above, except that
an extra cost component is introduced to capture the costs of laying the necessary
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onshore processing infrastrueture, tìinf,w' where the subscript inf denotes infrastructure.
Then the annual user cost, kc,w' of capital can be expressed as
(4)
kc,w = (r + (j w + Pw)tì v,W + (r + (j inf + Pinf )tìinf,w
where the subscript v denotes vessel. Notice that in principle, the depreciation rate, and
the foreign exchange premium for infrastructural and vessel costs can differ.
Operating expenses
Here too there are two components, expenses related to vessel operations and expenses
related to onshore processing. The former expenses incIude, annual costs of fuel and
lubrIcating oil, repairs and maintenance, fishing gear renewal, telecommunIcation and
radio expenses, and management and administrative costs. Others are costs of general
insurance cover for crew, catch, cargo, hull and machinery; license fees, le vies and
charges; harbour fees; and provisions. Similar cost elements related to onshore
processing are added to the costs stemming from vessel operation to get the total cost. In
this case too the annual costs under all the items above (except license fees, levies and
charges) are added together to obtain the annual social costs of landing and processing
a certain quantity of wetfish landings.
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3.4 The pro due tjon and profjt funetjons
In both theoretical and applied fishery economics, it is common to use the following
produetion function (see for instance, Reed, 1979 and Hannesson, 1993):
(5)
hi, = aixtei,t i = w, f
where h is the vessel and time dependent size of the harvest, x is the time dependent
stock size or biomass, the parameter a denotes the vessel dependent catchability
coefficient, and ei,t denotes the nuinber of trawlers of type i taken out to fish in period t.
The main assumption underlying h is that the ability to harvest fish at any point in time
is proportional to the biomass available in the habitat. The simple logic here is that it is
much easier (and by extension less costly) to harvest fish in a habitat full of fish than
one virtually empty of fish. This is partIcularly so in the case of non-schooling species
such as hake.
In the case where quotas are exogeneously determined as in this model, h is necessarily
equal to the quota: due to the potential for making pure profits, one would expect the
agents in the model to harvest up to the quota allocated. Hence, equation (5) above can
be written as
(6)
hi,t = aixtei,t = çi,Qi' i = w, f and IlÇi, = 1
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Here Q is the time dependent annual quota for hake and ç i is the share of the annual
quota allocated to agent i. Note that the number of vessels, e, needed to efficiently land
the quota allocated to each agent can be calculated if ai and x are known.
Now, the profit to a given agent in any given year can be written as
(7)
ni t = (Pi -qii)hitCF = (Pi - qiiKitQiCF, i = w, f., , ,
where P is the average market price per kg of the products from wetfish and freezer
trawler landings, CF denotes the conversion factor from catch to processed fish, andqi
denotes the average co st that must be incurred to land and process the same weight of
their landings.
3.5 Stoek dynamies and eonstraints
The stock constraint in this model comes in the form of the total quotas fixed annually
by the government. The players are free to maximise their profits from the fishery so
lon g as their combined harvest does not exceed the annual quota. Given the assumption
that quotas are optimally determined to ensure the long term survival of the stock, they
implicitly ensure that the underlying stock dynamics and constraints are respected all
the time.¡¡
¡ ¡ As mentioned elsewhere, the next paper in this series wil explicitly model the stock dynamics of hake.
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3.6 The social planner's objeetive
The objective of the social planner, that is, the Government of Namibia, is to choose a
sequence of quota shares, çi, (t=1,2,...,T) to obtain the highest possible discounted
profit from the total quota, using social costs and prIces. This translates into the
following mathematical expression:
(8)
max PV = maxi f ÍlC);Jiit J
tn g'J L t=1 i=1 .
subject to LJ i, = 1, i = w,f.
The reader may have realised by now that the optimal solution at any point in time is
sure to be a corner solution: it is a question of either or - if (Pi - cp i ) ~ (p -i - cp -i)'
where -i is the other agent, then the government wil allocate the whole of the annual
quota to i. There may, however, be switches from one agent to the other in a dynamic
sense. That is, it is possible through innovation and investment in human resource
development and modern technology, for the relative profitability of the vessels to
change in favour of one or the other from time to time.
In addition, the clear-cut results that are likely to emerge from the set up in this section
may have to be modified because of a number of other considerations: (i) employment
generation capacity, (ii) harvesting, proeessing and market constraints, and (iii) other
social and biological considerations.
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4. Numerical computations
4.1 Data
Three types of data are required for the computations planned herein, namely, quota,
vessel, and economic data.
4.1.1 Quota data
The average quota for the hake fishery from 1987 to 1994 is calculated to be about
75,000 Mt., while the average for the years 1992 to 1994 is about 115,000 Mt. The
medium term target of the government of Namibia is to achieve an annual quota of 150,
000 Mt. Baring unfavourable environmental conditions, the good resource management
structure put in place by the MFMR since independence, should make this target
achievable into the future, hence, luse this quota size in the analysis. It is, however, a
simple matter to change this figure for the purposes of sensitivity analysis.
Data on annual quotas for 1993 and 1994 shows that while 19.4% of the total quota in
1993 went to the wetfish trawlers, 48.9% went to them in 1994. Recall that the
government has set a target of 60:40% in favour of the wetfish trawlers in the very near
future, this target figure is what I use as the starting point for the analysis. In other
words, I start the analysisby first testing the economic rationality of these target shares.
4.1.2 Vessel data
The crucial data needed here include (i) the total catch per season per vessel, assuming
full-time fishing, (ii) fish landed per fishing power, whIch in the case of hake is the
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weight per horse power (HP) of fish landed (see Moorsom, 1994a), (Üi) the crew size on
each vessel and how many of these are skilled and unskiled.
All these data are either available in Moorsom (1994), or can be worked out from there.
The average values for the years 1993 and 1994 for both fishing capacity and fishing
power, for the different class sizes of vessels are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, for the
wetfish and freezer trawlers, respectively. Also included in the tables are the average
crew sizes for the different size classes of vessels.
Table 4.1: Data on wetfish trawlers
Source: Moorsom (1994)
Table 4.2: Data on freezer trawlers
Source: Moorsom (1994).
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4.1.3 Economic data: cost and price data
The export prIces of hake products vary considerably for different sizes of the same
product. For instance, the different sizes of hake filets went for anything from N$ 6.50
to N$ 8.70 per kilogram in 1994. In this paper average prices wil be used. To work out
such prIces, I make the following assumptions:
1. Catch by freezer trawlers is processed into an 80:20 mix of hake filets and head and
gutted (H&G) hake, respectively'
2. Catch by wetfish trawlers is processed into a 70:20: 10 mix of hake filets, H&G hake
and fresh hake, respectively.
3. For the hake H&G product, 40% turns out to be of sizes 1 - 4, and 60% of sizes 5 and
6.
4. For the hake filet product, 25% is of sizes 3 and 4, and 75% of sizes 5 and 6.
Using assumptions (3) and (4) as a basis, the average prices of hake H&G and hake
filets are calculated and presented in the tables below.¡Z We see from these tables that
hake H&G commands an average price of N$4.69 per kg, while hake filets command a
price of N$8.05.
To calculate the average prIce per kg of fres h hake, I made a comparison between the
price for frozen filets with that for fresh hake filets. This revealed that the latter
commands a premium prIce to the tune of up to 100% more than the average price per
¡Z The ca1culations and assumptions underlying them are based on data obtained partly from the MFMR,
partly from fishing companies active in the Namibian EEZ, and partly from personal communications.
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kg for the former. Indeed, fresh hake filets achieved a price of up to N$ 16.10 per kg in
1994 and early 1995.
Table 4.3: Calculating the average seIlng price of hake H&G
From assumptions (1) and (2) and the ca1culations above, the average price per kg of
processed fish from the freezer trawlers turns out to be N$ (0.8*8.05+0.2*4.69) = N$
7.38, and for the wetfish trawlers, N$ (0.7*8.05+0.2*4.69+0.1 *16.10) = N$ 8.18.
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Table 4.4: Calculating the average seIlng price of hake filet
The total social co st (both vessel and onshore) per kg of processed fish from wetfish
trawler landings is calculated to be N$4.55. Similarly, the total social cost per kg of
processed fish from freezer trawler landings is ca1culated to be N$4. 76. To arrive at
these figures, data from the MFMR, and from fishing companies active in the Namibian
EEZ were used.
4.2 The numerieal results
The algebraic modeling language AMPL (Fourer et aL. 1993) is used as computational
aid. Combining the theoretical framework set out in section 3 and the data given in sub-
section 4.1, AMPL computed the results presented below. The AMPL model and data
files used for the computations are given in the appendix. Also presented in the
appendix are the frameworks for the calculations.
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The total present value of economIc rent from the resource given the government target
of 60:40 allocation of the annual quota to w andfis N$10.42 bilion. On the other hand,
the economically efficient allocation turns out to be 100:0 to w andf, respectively. This
allocation results in a total present value of economic rent of N$11.69 bilion. Thus, the
economic loss due to the implementation of the current government target rather than
the economically optimal share is N$1.27 billon, about 11 % of what is achievable .
Table 4.5: The PV of economic rent, employment generation, and fleet sizes required to land
different quota allocations¡3
13 The fleet sizes and employment generations abilities are worked out us ing the frameworks given in
appendix 2 and 3.
¡4 Fleet sizes for vessels with size c1asses 1400-2000 and 1500-1999 HP, respectively, for w and!
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To facilitate the discussion to follow in section 5, I present in Table 4.5 a summary of
the results highlighting economic rent, employment generation, and optimal fleet sizes
for different allocations of the annual quota.
5. Discussion
First, I state the main findings of the paper, then I discuss the limitations of the study,
and finally, I discuss policy implications that can be derived from the study.
5. 1 Summary of findings
The recent government policy to allocate more and more of the annual quota for hake to
the wetfish trawlers is an economIcally sensible decision. However, the current policy
target of 60:40 percent of the quo ta to the wetfish and the freezer trawlers is sub-
optimal. This would result in a total present value of economic rent of N$l 0.42 billon,
which is about N$1.27 bilion (about 11 %) less than what is achievable under the
optimal allocation, which is 100:0 in favour of the wetfish trawlers. With this allocation,
a total PV of economic rent of N$11.69 bilion is achievable.
In terms of employment generation, more allocation to the wetfish trawlers is a good
thing, as this dass of vessels generate more that six times the employment generated by
the freezer trawlers for the same quota allocation (see table 4.5). It is possible to
generate up to 7800 positions of various kinds annually from the activities in the hake
fishery if the optimal solution is implemented.
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The fleet size necessary to land the optimal allocation of the quota is 53 wetfish trawlers
of size cIass 1400-2000 HP or its equivalent. In the case of the declared government
policy of 60:40 allocation, the necessary fleet sizes of both wetfish (size cIass 1400-
2000 HP) and freezer (size dass 1500-1999 HP) trawlers are 32 and 13, respectively.
5.2 Limitations and sensitivity analysis
The main limitations of this study are to be found in the estimation and calculation of
the parameters of the model. I discuss these below and offer sensitivity analysis, where
necessary.
The costs and prices usedin the study are highly aggregated, derived from average
prIces and costs from a number of sources. I would therefore recommend that the model
be re-run when more detailed data is available, most likelyafter the ongoing work on
the fisheries database being developed by the statistics offIce in the MFMR is
completed. To check the robustness of the present results against changes in costs and
prIces, sensitivity analysis are caried out. These indicate that our results with respect to
optimal allocation remains valid so long as the relative prices and costs of the Freezer
Trawler Group do not improve by more than 14 and 21 %, respectively, in relation to
those of the Wetfish Trawler Group. An interesting interpretation of this result is that,
the estimated prices and costs must deviate from their correct values by up to 14 and
21 %, respectively, for the resuIts of the study to be invalidated.
Varying the discount rate wil surely affect the PV of economIc rent achievable but wil
not affect the crucial finding on what share to be allocated to which vessel group. For
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instance, an increase in the discount rate from the 2% used in the computation to 3%
reduces the PV of economic rent to N$8.72 from N$11.69 bilion.
An increase or decrease in the projected annual quota for hake wil again affect the
economic benefit from the resource but not the results concerning the optimal allocation
of the quota. Since management problems usually arise when the actual quota turns out
to be less than the predieted, I carry out a sensitivity analysis of the case where the quota
turns out to be 25% less than expected. In this case, the PV of economic rent is N$ 8.77
bilion.
The conversion factor (CF) from catch to processed product is a key parameter, by this I
mean it is capable of turning the results of the study around if the estimated value is
very different from the actual. Because of this, care was taken in estimating it.
6. Concluding remarks
Based on the results outlned above, one may jump into the conc1usion that the freezer
trawlers should be banned from the exploitation of hake altogether: both economic
efficiency and employment generation criteria support this change. There are, however,
other issues to be taken into consideration. First, we should be interested in benefiting
from certain intrinsIc advantages of harvesting hake with freezer trawlers. An example
of such an advantage is the fact that freezer trawlers fish mainly in deeper waters than
their wetfish counterparts, thereby ensuring a good spread of fishing activity in the
habitat than would be possible if only wetfish trawlers were employed. Such a spre ad is
positive for the biological well being of the habitat and the fish contained therein.
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Second, using freezer quota allocation may be one way to tackle some of the issues
raised by the affirmative action policy of the Namibian government. Allocation of some
of the annual quota of hake to the freezer trawlers could be a way to enhance the
participation of disadvantaged groups, at 1east in the short and medium term. Freezer
vessel quo tas can, for instance, be given to weaker and new participants in the industry
who need a break to enable them establish themselves economically before they are
moved to wetfish quotas: where investment costs are generally higher. For instance, the
situation of the private consessionaires (mentioned earlier) could be improved by giving
them freezer quotas rather than wetfish quotas in the short term to enable them build the
necessar base to survive in the business.
It is worth noting that our study does not capture all the benefits of exploiting hake with
wetfish trawlers. For example, the many jobs created indirectly as a result of onshore
proeessing are not taken into account, so also is the fact that many by-products are
retrieved from what would otherwise be considered waste on freezer trawlers. The
greater choIce of what to do with the catch (frozen, wet, downstream processing, etc.)
are also not captured. Lastly, the fact that the creation of local economies of skil may
result from wettish landings are also not included in the analysis. On the strength of all
these points together with the hard findings of the study, I conclude that the Namibian
policy of sharing the annua! quota of hake on a 60:40 basis in favour of the wetfish
trawlers is in the right direction. The policy has the potential to contribute in a
meaningful manner to the economic development of post-independent Namibia.
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Appendix 1: AMPL fies
###AMPL modelfile: Gives the model statements in the AMPL language###
param T;:O integer;
set Player;
set Periods:= l.T;
# the time horizon of the model, fixed at 100 years.
# the players are w and f
param price i Player L ;
param cost i Player L ;
param Quota it in l.Tl;:O;
param CF iPlayerl;
param DF;:O;
var Share ip in Player, t in l.Tl ;:=0;
maximize presenevalue: sum it in l.Tl
(sum ip in Player L Quota(t)*CF(p) * Share(p,t) *
DFAt * (prIce(p) - cost(pJ) );
subject to limit1 ip in Player,tin l.Tl: 00:= Share(p,t) 0:=1;
subject to limit2 it in l.Tl: sumip in Playerl Share (p,t)o:=l;
# the conversion factor
# the disco unt factor
# the variable in the model: share of quota
###AMPL datafile: Gives the base line data for the model###
set Player:= wet freezer;
param T := 100;
param: price cost CF
wet 8180 4550 0.505
freezer 7380 4760 0.51;
param Quota default 150000;
param DF := 0.98;
Appendix 2: General framework for calculating optimal number of vessels required
to land quota allocation
Quota allocation =
Capacity of vessel (tpa) =
Optimal number of vessels = Quota allocation/vessel capacity =
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Appendix 3: General framework for calculating labour requirements
For freezer vessel
Crew size per vessel =
Optimal number of vessels to land quota allocation =
Employment generation = crew size*optimal number of
For wetfish vessel
Crew size per vessel
Optimal number of vessels to land quota allocation
Direct employment generation = crew size*optimal number of
Add employment generation in proeessing
Total employment generation
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